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Greenpeace, Social Media, and the Possibility
of Global Deliberation on the Environment
MICHAEL RoOSE*
ABSTRACT

Greenpeace uses the developmental republican model of democratic
governance for setting organizationalpolicy. This model does an excellent
job of forming members into effective leaders who are committed to the
organizationand its mission. However, Greenpeace could more effectively
encourage the global community to become involved in environmental
activism and set more responsive policy by employing an Internet-based
deliberativedemocracy policy-settingprocess.
INTRODUCTION

In an age in which democracy forms the basis for the legitimacy of
global governance, one would think that nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) would embrace democracy as a means of self-governance. This
assumption is especially relevant in the context of NGOs that claim to act
in the interest of the world's population as a whole, such as
environmental organizations addressing issues that have an impact on
the lives of everyone.
Greenpeace claims to value democracy as a means for global decision
making' and asserts democratic legitimacy. 2 In addition, Greenpeace has
made accusations that the World Trade Organization (WTO) has an
undemocratic voting structure as a basis for denouncing the organization. 3
* Articles Editor, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies; J.D. Candidate, 2012,
Indiana University Maurer School of Law; B.A., 2007, Indiana University. I would like
to thank Professors Susan Williams and John Applegate for their valuable feedback and
guidance on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank my colleagues on this journal for
editing this Note.
1. See Governance Structure, GREENPEACE INT'L, http://www.greenpeace.org/
internationallenlabout/how-is-greenpeace-structured/governance-structure/ (last visited
Dec. 12, 2010).
2. See id.
3. See Secretive and Undemocratic, GREENPEACE INT'L, http://www.greenpeace.org/
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However, Greenpeace itself may be subject to accusations that it lacks
democratic legitimacy. Greenpeace must deal with the unresolved problems
of defining the demOS4 the organization represents and the ability of the
demos to have an input into the activities of the organization.
Greenpeace has adopted a developmental republican structure of
democratic governance, but the fundamental problem with this
governance structure is that it resembles a bureaucracy rather than a
democratic community of citizens. The relationship between management
and participants is analogous to the hierarchical structure of a branch of
the civil service. Low-level members must tolerate management's policy
goals until rising to a position to change that policy, or they can leave the
organization. This mechanism is effective for producing bureaucrats who
carry out management's policy. Yet, in the context of environmental
advocacy, the bureaucratic structure weakens the organization's ability to
foster activism and to respond to grassroots environmental concerns.
The current developmental republican structure is not suited to
instilling the notion of citizenship in the global populace at large,
meaning that participants do not have the sense of entitlement to
participate in governance or duty of loyalty that members of democratic
systems should possess. Greenpeace could inspire greater amounts of
environmental activism and increase the quality of its policy goals by
creating a social media outlet to implement the principles laid out in
deliberative democracy theory.
Section I of this Note examines the current governance structure of
Greenpeace, which is based on the developmental republican model.
Section II is an examination of deliberative democratic theory and a
criticism of implementing developmental republicanism as a means of
making policy decisions. Section III proposes a model for utilizing
deliberative democracy on a global scale with social media. Section IV
provides concluding remarks.
I. A DEVELOPMENTAL REPUBLICAN MODEL OF DEMOCRACY
Greenpeace employs a developmental republican model of
democracy. 5 The governance structure is representational. A select

international/campaigns/trade-and-the-environment/why-is-the-wto-a-problem/secretiveand-undemocratic/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2010).
4. This word is frequently used in literature on democratic theory and represents "the
people of a nation considered as a political unit as distinguished from a tribe or kinship
group." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 600 (1993). Demos means

"populace" in Greek and shares its root with the word "democracy." Id.
5. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 92 (3d ed. 2006), for a description of

developmental republican democratic theory.
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group, drawn from Greenpeace International's (GPI) broad member
base, is responsible for selecting policy goals and carrying out the dayto-day operations of the NGO. Greenpeace is republican because the
organization's goal is to work toward the common good of preserving the
global environmental commons. Greenpeace is developmental due to the
high value it places on service to environmental organizations and
causes. For the most part, voting rights are tied to a lengthy service
requirement, which implies that those who have completed extended
service are more virtuous and able to make better decisions in guiding
the organization. The governance structures of both GPI and
Greenpeace
USA
(GPUSA)
demonstrate
the
organization's
developmental republican character.
A. Democratic, FederalStructure

Greenpeace governs itself democratically at the international level6
and within GPUSA.7 The organization's Web site states "Greenpeace's
global governance structure reflects [the organization's] fundamental
respect for global democratic principles and [Greenpeace's] need to
maintain a high level of internationalism and coordination."8
Greenpeace operates under a federal structure, facilitating
international cooperation among the national and regional offices
(NROs). According to the organization's Web site, GPI sits atop twentyeight NROs.9 Policy is set at the international level, and the NROs are
responsible for fundraising and implementing jointly agreed global
campaign strategies.10
B. Greenpeace International

GPI, "the body that coordinates global Greenpeace policy and
strategy, is an organization of about 175 staff, largely based in
Amsterdam." 1 GPI facilitates international cooperation, oversees the
finances and management of the NROs, and attempts to expand

6. GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure,supra note 1.
7. See generallyAMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS OF GREENPEACE, INC. (2006).
8. GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure,supra note 1.
9. Greenpeace
Structure
and
Organisation,
GREENPEACE
INT'L,
http://www.greenpeace.org/internationallen/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/ (last visited
Dec. 12, 2010).
10. See id.
11. GREENPEACE INT'L, GovernanceStructure, supra note 1.
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Greenpeace's global presence.12 GPI is composed of three main bodies:
the NRO trustees, the Board of Directors, and the Executive Director.' 3
There are currently twenty-eight trustees, each representing their
NRO at the GPI Annual General Meeting (AGM).14 Collectively, the
twenty-eight trustees constitute the Council. The main responsibilities
of the trustees are electing the International Board, approving the
annual GPI budget ceiling, and proposing policy goals to the
International Board.15 The Council has the authority to make
nonbinding policy recommendations to the Board.' 6 The Board may
choose whether to ratify that recommendation, but if it decides not to
ratify, the Council may remove the Board.' 7
There are seven members on the Board of Directors of GPI. The
International Board approves GPI's annual budget, oversees the
International Executive Director and NROs, and, after discussions with
the trustees at the AGM, decides Greenpeace policy on issues that the
trustees identify.' 8
The International Executive Director manages the administrative
bureaucracy of the organization.' 9 The International Board appoints
and supervises the International Executive Director. The International
Executive Director oversees the Senior Management Team, which is
composed of the directors of GPI's various administrative
departments. 20
C. Nationaland Regional Offices
Governance and elections vary among the different national and
regional offices, so I will use GPUSA's governance system as an example
of a national office. The organization of GPI and GPUSA is similar in
that both have an elected Board of Directors that appoint an Executive

12. Id.

13. See id.
14. See id (explaining that each NRO appoints a representative to the GPI Annual
General Meeting).
15. See id.
16. STICHTING GREENPEACE COUNCIL, RULES OF PROCEDURE
RULES OF PROCEDURE].

§

4.1 (2004) [hereinafter

17. Id. § 5.7.
18. See GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure, supranote 1.
19. See Management Structure, GREENPEACE INT'L, http://www.greenpeace.org/
internationallen/about/how-is-greenpeace-structured/management/ (last visited Dec. 12,
2010).
20. Id.

351

GLOBAL DELIBERATION ON THE ENVIRONMENT

Director. 21 In both instances, the Executive Director is responsible for
the day-to-day management of the organization's internal affairs. 22 The
two major features distinguishing GPUSA's governance system from
that of GPI are the office of the Chairperson of the Board and the
composition of the voting population. The Chairperson of the Board
presides over meetings of the Board of Directors and represents the
national office as the GPI trustee at the AGM.23
The voting membership is restricted to a narrow class of not less
than forty and no more than one hundred people who contribute to and
are involved in the organization.24 The features of this voting class
demonstrate Greenpeace's developmental republican system of
government. In order to become a voting member of GPUSA, one must
apply to and receive approval from the Board of Directors. 25 The Board
may only enfranchise members who have completed six years of service
to environmental causes, and a limited number of people for whom the
Board may choose to waive the service requirement. 26 The restricted
voting class ensures that not only the representatives of the
organization, but also the voting members themselves, are virtuous.
Virtue is learned by participation in Greenpeace or one of its affiliated
environmental organizations.
D. Strengths of the Developmental Republican Model
The developmental republican model has several strengths as a
governance structure for Greenpeace: it instills virtue in its voting
members through the service requirement; the voting population of
Greenpeace is homogenous in its goal of protecting the environment; the
most virtuous members are promoted to the positions of greatest
responsibility and power; the small voting population allows for real
deliberation on policy; and the democratic and deliberative processes
legitimize the decisions made at the AGM to a certain extent.
As I will discuss in Section III, however, deliberative democracy
through social media is a more appropriate way to set policy because
that system would encourage greater deliberation. Most of the strengths
21. See AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWS OF GREENPEACE, INC.,

§

7.1 (2006)

(stipulating which of GPUSA's officers must be appointed by the Board of Directors).
22. See id. § 7.3 (explaining that the Executive Director is the "general manager and
chief executive officer" of GPUSA).
23. See id. § 7.2. Members of the Stichting Greenpeace Council, for the most part, are
trustees sent from the national offices to attend the Annual General Meeting. RULES OF
PROCEDURE, supra note 16, §§ 4.4-4.5.
24. Id. § 2.1.
25. See id. (explaining the requirements one must meet to become a voting member).
26. Id.
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above are best suited to developing a loyal group of bureaucrats who can
protect the organization from financial problems, prevent hijacking by
parties adverse to Greenpeace's mission, and carry out its policy goals.
Developmental republicanism and an effective bureaucracy require
citizens who are virtuous and homogenous. The service requirement is
an effective filter for allowing only those who are virtuous and
committed to the organization to vote on policy. Requiring six years of
service prevents both Greenpeace's enemies and those who do not
embrace the organization's aims from actively participating in the
organization. Voting members have already demonstrated their
allegiance to the organization by contributing a substantial portion of
their lives to its activities. The service requirement has the added
benefit of producing voting members who share a conception of what is
best for the environment. Also, the service requirement gives voting
members an understanding of the inner workings of the organization.
The developmental republican model grooms members to become more
effective institutional leaders in the future, ensuring the continued
existence of Greenpeace as an organization.
Greenpeace's upward filtration process is similar to what James
Madison describes in FederalistNumber 10,27 producing a small body of
the most virtuous citizens who then set organizational policy. The
voting members choose the national and regional Board of Directors, 28
whose members then choose the trustees. 29 These members then vote,
along with the other trustees from the NROs, for International Board of
Directors members and on organizational policy.3 0 The filtration process
promotes knowledgeable and skillful bureaucrats who are committed to
protecting the organization from insolvency and who are able to
implement policy goals. Additionally, each level of voting acts as
another filter to allow only the most virtuous Greenpeace members to
set GPI's global policy, preventing parties adverse to Greenpeace from
participating in governance.
The approximately thirty-five participants in the AGM can make
virtuous policy decisions because the small number of members allows
trustees and Board members to meet in-person. Through a process of
deliberation, given the limits of their knowledge and experience, they
27. See James Madison, The Federalist No. 10, in THE FEDERALIST WITH LETIERS OF
"BRUTUs" 44 (Terence Ball ed., 2003) ("The effect of [representative government] is ... to
refine and enlarge public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of
citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations.").
28. AMENDED AND RESTATED BYLAWs OF GREENPEACE, INC., supra note 7, § 5.1.
29. Id. §§ 7.1-7.2.
30. GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure, supranote 1.
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can discover the global common good in the field of environmentalism.
Such a small decision-making body allows the Council to do more than
simply conduct yes-or-no votes on agenda items. Instead, the size of the
Council allows the members to engage in meaningful discussion on
policy. The actions of the Council are legitimized by both the democratic
process that elected the trustees and Board members and by the fact
that the decisions were reached in a deliberative, rather than selfinterested, manner.
Thus, there are three major strengths of the Greenpeace
developmental republican governance system: fostering virtue and
homogeneity in its members before they are enfranchised, allowing the
democratic process to promote the most virtuous members, and
legitimizing the decisions of the Council by creating a forum conducive
to deliberation. As a result, members at the highest level of Greenpeace
are able leaders'who can succeed in implementing policy and ensure the
continued existence of the organization. Yet, as the next section
demonstrates, while the Council's size is conducive to deliberation, a
social media platform where everyone may participate would be a better
way to determine appropriate policy areas to focus resources.
II. INCREASING PARTICIPATION IN POLICY DECISIONS THROUGH
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

Developmental republicanism is a strong means for preserving the
long-term solvency of the organization and for efficiently implementing
policy. Consequently, as an executive body, the International Board
works well. Yet, analyzing the current Greenpeace decision-making
process from the perspective of deliberative democracy, as articulated by
Iris Marion Young and Seyla Benhabib, yields two major criticisms.
First, very few members of Greenpeace, let alone those influenced by
Greenpeace policy, actually play a role in setting the organization's
policy. Second, by allowing the global community more control over, and
input into, the decision-making process, Greenpeace could take
advantage of opportunities to increase participation in environmental
activism and the responsiveness of its policy by reaching beyond the
limited knowledge and perspective of its own homogenous membership.
The current restrictions on participation in policy deliberation
represent a form of paternalism that discourages potential activists
from becoming involved in Greenpeace. Very few people control the
issues to which Greenpeace devotes its resources, but the organization's
activities have an impact on the global commons. Only registered
members consent to the organization's influence, and those who
disagree with Greenpeace's policies have no means of eliciting change.
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Viewed in this light, Greenpeace resembles a faction more than a
democratic institution.
In addition to hindering participation in Greenpeace, the
developmental republican policy-setting structure reduces the quality of
policy. Under the current model, new environmental causes filter up
through the organization, potentially leading to bureaucratic
groupthink. As members rise through the organization, their local
contacts must necessarily decrease due to time constraints, and those
members might become ideologically homogeneous on many matters.
Greenpeace could increase the quality of its decision making by
providing a platform for people to raise awareness of issues impacting
their lives, allowing resources to be allocated to the causes that need the
most attention.
A. Who Does Greenpeace Represent?
As John McGinnis, a scholar of international law, illustrates, there
is confusion as to who Greenpeace's constituency includes. He states,
"Greenpeace is a predominantly Western organization whose views are
unrepresentative even of many citizens in the West. NGOs are
essentially transnational factions .

. . ."s1

Within this statement, there

are two competing visions of whom Greenpeace represents. The
organization may act on behalf of either its members, forming an
international faction, or on behalf of all citizens of the global
community.
Ultimately, Greenpeace's constituency is the entire world, but the
current paternalistic policy-setting mechanism discourages its demos
from devoting time or resources to the organization. Greenpeace itself
claims to "speak for 2.8 million supporters worldwide." 32 Thus, strictly
speaking, the demos that Greenpeace purports to represent are
composed only of registered Greenpeace members. The source of
Greenpeace's democratic legitimacy, then, rests on the fact that
members are free to register and disassociate at any time, expressing
their explicit consent to be associated with the organization's policies.
Greenpeace, however, "encourages many millions more than [their
members] to take action every day,"33 implying that the population for
whom the organization speaks is broader than its member base.

31. John 0. McGinnis, The Appropriate Hierarchy of Global Multilateralism and
Customary InternationalLaw: The Example of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 245 (2003).
32. About Greenpeace, GREENPEACE INT'L, http://www.greenpeace.org/internationall
en/about/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2010).
33. Id.
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Regardless of its official stance, Greenpeace is effectively speaking
for the global citizenry because the organization's policies affect the
environment, which belongs to everyone. While arguing in favor of
deliberative democracy, Benhabib writes that "only those norms . . . can

be said to be valid . .. which would be agreed to by all those affected by
their consequences." 34 Therefore, everyone who is impacted by
Greenpeace's procedural and substantive decisions would have to agree
in order for them to be legitimate. She goes on to add that
"environmental issues in general are a perfect example of such
instances when the boundaries of discourses keep expanding because
the consequences of our actions expand and affect increasingly more
people."35 Use of the global commons in an irresponsible manner affects
the entire world, so policies regarding how environmental organizations
employ their resources are relevant to everyone.
Greenpeace's limited voting class discourages people from
participating in the organization. As the previous analysis of the
GPUSA voting structure demonstrates, the organization-wide
enfranchised population is quite small. It is currently restricted to two
types of people: those who complete the six-year service requirement
and those ten people or fewer that the Domestic Board enfranchises for
other reasons. Unsurprisingly, as with any organization of this scale,
Greenpeace has critics, both internal and external. There are no means
available for dissenters to participate in the organization's decisions,
even when Greenpeace's policy affects the lives of everyone. Indeed, in
order to participate in the governance of Greenpeace, people are
effectively required to complete six years of service, working to
implement policies with which they disagree. Whereas the loyalty of
bureaucrats to top-down policies is valuable in an executive body,
excluding all other global citizens leads to a lack of motivation to
participate.
Greenpeace fails to provide a valid basis for its paternalistic
influence on the lives of nonmembers. To legitimately act on behalf of
the global community as a whole and to justify its claims to democratic
legitimacy, the organization should increase participation in decision
making beyond the homogenous cabal of voting members. Beyond the
few thousand worldwide voting members, access to the organization as a
means to give input is nearly nonexistent. The fact that so few people
are enfranchised inhibits the organization's ability to inspire grassroots

34. Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE: CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 67, 70

(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996).
35. Id.
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participation, and the current model provides no answer to Benhabib's
definition of the demos as all who are affected.
B. Filtrationof Ideas and Experience
Greenpeace's agenda-setting procedure creates a large gap between
the global community and the International Board elites by failing to
incorporate the diversity of perspective that is present in the world. The
current governance structure provides a mechanism to filter ideas for
new policy decisions up the internal hierarchy, eventually moving from
a registered member to the Council and International Board.36
Presumably, the Council does an adequate job of deliberating, but only
if one takes into consideration the limited knowledge and narrow range
of issues with which the Council deals. By expanding participation to
include the whole of humanity, Greenpeace could improve the quality of
deliberation, as worldwide deliberation would place power in the hands
of a truly diverse decision-making body, rather than the homogenous
Council.
Young writes that "[p]reserving and listening across .

.

. differences

of position and perspective causes the transformation in preference that
deliberative theorists recommend."37 She proposes three causes of this
transformation that provide a basis for criticizing the current filtration
system for selecting policy areas upon which to focus resources: selfreflection, the transformation of self-interest into appeals to justice, and
the development of shared knowledge.38
First, Young states that "[clonfrontation with different perspectives,
interests, and cultural meanings teaches me the partiality of my own,
reveals to me my own experience as perspectival." 9 As noted above, the
Council is largely homogenous in that its members are
environmentalists who have spent a great deal of time in the
organization. All of the members have been filtered through the
demanding selection process. While allegiance to Greenpeace is
beneficial when selecting people to look after the long-term health of the
organization, the selection process effectively eliminates dissent from
the status quo. Expanding the deliberation to include the entire world
would oblige the decision makers to confront people who are different
from them, thereby forcing them to recognize the concerns of others and
reconsider their own perspectives.
36. See GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure, supranote 1.
37. IRIS MARION YOUNG, INTERSECTING VOICES: DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY, AND POLICY 68 (1997).
38. See id. at 68-69.
39. Id. at 68.
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Second, Young states that this recognition of diversity "forces me to
transform my expressions of self-interest and desire into appeals to
justice."40 While the Council likely thinks that it is formulating just, fair
policy, without exposure to people "with different perspectives,
interests, and cultural meanings," the deliberation does not cause the
transformation in preferences that is the goal of deliberation. Young
claims, "plural public perspectives require such expressed claims to
appeal across difference, to presume a lack of understanding to be
bridged, thus transforming the experience itself."41 Under a global
deliberative model, policy decisions justified in terms that appeal only to
environmentalists would not suffice, whereas the Council does not have
to provide reasons for its decisions to anyone except other high-level
members. The process of policy development must be more inclusive of
the views of those outside the cadre of dedicated environmentalists.
Finally, Young asserts that deliberation imparts information,42 and
Greenpeace's filter process does not provide an adequate method to
inform Council members in their low-participation deliberation. In a
related discussion, Benhabib writes "no single individual can anticipate
and foresee all the variety of perspectives through which matters of
ethics and politics would be perceived by different individuals; and ...
no single individual can possess all the information deemed relevant to
a certain decision affecting all."43 These two criticisms are particularly
relevant to Greenpeace, because the twenty-eight-member board can
hardly be said to possess the collective knowledge of the twenty-eight
NROs they represent, 44 2.8 million members, 45 and the global
community. Young asserts that "through listening across difference
each position can come to understand something about the ways
proposals and claims affect others differently situated."46 Not only is
knowledge of subject areas increased, but also expanded participation
contributes to deeper knowledge of global interconnectedness and effects
on others.
III. INTERNET-BASED DELIBERATION

Raising the level of participation in the process of deliberation
beyond the current voting membership would encourage greater
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
Id. at 68-69.
Id. at 69.
Benhabib, supra note 34, at 71.
GREENPEACE INT'L, Governance Structure,supra note 1.
GREENPEACE INT'L, About Greenpeace, supra note 32.
YOUNG, supra note 37, at 69.

358

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 19:1

participation in environmental activism and improve the quality of
decisions without sacrificing the most important strength of the
developmental republican model. That is, to preserve Greenpeace as an
institution by placing experienced members committed to the
organization in positions of responsibility for controlling finances and
successfully implementing projects. A major perceived drawback of the
deliberative system is the lack of scalability, 47 but establishing the
Internet-based forum for deliberation that I propose would allow
participation of all who have access to the Internet, providing global
citizens with an entry into environmentalism and improving the quality
of the deliberation by integrating a diversity of perspectives into the
dialogue.
A. Defining Deliberation
Merely expanding participation would not necessarily improve
policy making. To test the deliberative character of my model forum for
discourse, I will analyze it through the democracy theory of Benhabib,
while also incorporating the criticism of Young into my own
characterization of legitimate discourse.
Benhabib provides three rules for discourse that serve to legitimize
the resulting decision-making process and substantive policy, all of
which are underpinned by the values of inclusion, freedom, and
equality. 48 The first rule of discourse that Benhabib articulates is that
"participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality
and symmetry, all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to
question, to interrogate, and to open debate." 49 The second rule of
discourse is that "all have the right to question the assigned topics of
conversation."50 The final rule of discourse that Benhabib lists is that
"all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of
the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or
carried out."51 The three rules are the equal opportunity to initiate
speech, set the agenda, and establish procedure.
In addition to Benhabib's rules of discourse, Young points out that
the style of acceptable discourse must not be limited to critical
47. By "lack of scalability," I mean that while deliberative democracy works well on a
small scale, it is often said to be impractical when the number of participants becomes too
great.
48. See Benhabib, supra note 34, at 69 (discussing inclusion in terms of collective
deliberation).
49. Id. at 70.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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argument because doing so excludes a large number of people. 52 She
states "bracketing political and economic power is [not] sufficient to
make speakers equal" and claims that people do not have the same
sense of entitlement to the right to speak or speak in a manner that
carries as much weight in the context of a critical argument.5 3 She
states that
[i]n many formal situations the better-educated white
middle-class people .

.

. often act as though they have a

right to speak and that their words carry authority,
whereas those of other groups often . . . do not speak, or

speak only in a way that those in charge find
"disruptive."54
The forum, then, must not be structured as a critical argument, or large
segments of the population will not participate. Also, the rules of the
discourse must allow for speech that is neither "formal and general"55
nor "dispassionate and disembodied,"5 6 because while those forms of
speech are considered valuable among elites in the West, those limits on
the discourse are culturally biased and serve to exclude people who are
not from privileged backgrounds.5 7 These considerations are particularly
important when trying to foster global participation because eliminating
de jure exclusion is worthless if de facto exclusion is still operating.
B. The Model
As a basis for the model of Internet-based deliberative democracy I
propose, I draw from Beth Simone Noveck's deliberative electronic
democracy tool, Unchat.5 8 My model differs from Unchat in several
respects, mainly -in that my model is more decentralized to
accommodate a much greater participation and is less wary of irrational
modes of communication. The Web site Digg.com is an example of a
forum that could be adapted to facilitate the implementation of a
deliberative democracy model in the context of Greenpeace.
52. See YOUNG, supra note 37, at 60.
53. Id. at 63.
54. Id. at 64.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 64-65 (arguing that the "speech cultures" of women and racial minorities
are devalued compared to the "speech culture" of white, middle-class men).
58. See generally Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy in
Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. Scl. & TECH. L. 1 (2003).
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Digg.com is a social media Web site that, in October 2011, is
estimated to have received over 4.3 million visitors.5 9 According to
Digg.com,
Digg is a place for people to discover and share content
found on the web. From the biggest online destination to
the most obscure blog, Digg surfaces the best stuff as
voted on by our users. You won't find editors at Diggwe're here to provide a place where people collectively
determine the value of content."60
Links that receive the most votes are listed on the front page and user
traffic to those links "regularly overwhelm[s] and temporarily shut[s]
down websites in a process called the 'Digg Effect."'6 1
Greenpeace could establish a similar forum in which people would
meet to deliberate on what policy objectives the organization should
adopt, through a process of posting links to articles, videos, and images.
Such a model would serve to alleviate two related problems in
implementing organization-wide deliberative democracy: conducting
real deliberation that includes such a large number of people and
producing decisions that are representative of the global community.
1. Fostering Real, Organization-WideDeliberation

Noveck writes that "[c]yberspace is flexible enough that users ought
to be able to convene in different sorts of spaces according to the rules
they set for themselves." 62 The goal of this model is to produce
deliberation that meets Benhabib and Young's characterization of
discourse by providing adequate opportunity for universal participation.
My model would allow the global community to control what items
will be on the agenda, fulfilling the first of Benhabib's requirements for
deliberation. Participants would be able to post links that they
considered important to setting the organization's annual policies.
There would be no restrictions on content, but members would be free to
vote for links to bring them onto a prominent list of the most popular
webpages. Only content that a large number of users find relevant and
59. Digg.com Traffic and Demographic Statistics by Quantcast, QUANTCAST,
http://www.quantcast.com/digg.com (last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
60. Frequently Asked Questions: Digg About, DIGG, http://about.digg.com/faq (last
visited Dec. 22, 2011).
61. Oleoleolson, Massive Censorship of Digg Uncovered, ALTERNET (Aug. 5, 2010, 4:40
AM), http://blogs.alternet.org/oleoleolson/2010/08/05/massive-censorship-of-digg-uncovered/.
62. Noveck, supra note 58, at 69.
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favorable would reach that list. Otherwise, the links would lie dormant,
stuck at the preliminary stage. The members themselves would have
complete democratic control over agenda items in this way.
In addition to the ability to post stories, Benhabib's requirement
that participants "all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to
question, to interrogate, and to open debate"63 would be met by a
comment feature. Users would have the opportunity to right incorrect
assertions contained in the webpage, and other members would have a
chance to rebut those claims of falsehood by providing other links or
making original appeals. Comments themselves would also be subject to
democratic vote, and comments receiving the most votes would rise to
the top of the stack. The user's comments would remain available at the
bottom of the page so as not to act as a censor to speech.
To fulfill Benhabib's final requirement, users would also be able to
propose reforms to the process by which the forum operates. Stories on
Digg.com often propose changes to the structure by which the Web site
is governed. 64 In fact, these rules have been changed. In May 2009, a
right-wing cartel, called the Digg Patriots, organized itself to effectively
control the agenda,6 5 and Digg.com temporarily suspended the "bury"
feature in reaction to that episode.66 For this reason, any online
Greenpeace forum for deliberation must provide the opportunity to
police the forum and enforce the rules of discourse.
Much of the problem Digg.com faces is that users are anonymous
and banning them is nearly impossible. As Noveck writes:
[W]hen communication functions as a means for public
decision making and not as entertainment, participants
must be identifiable and accountable. Being known by
name encourages responsible participation because it
connects public action with personal reputation. In a
chat room where participants are not accountable, there
are no consequences, even for opinions that are
destructive and prejudicial.67

63. Benhabib, supra note 34, at 70.
64. See, e.g., Digg This if You Are Sick of Power Users Stealing Stories, DIGG,
http://digg.comnews/story/Digg-thisif yoursickof powerusers stealing-stories (last visited
Dec. 12, 2010).
65. See Oleoleolson, supranote 61.
66. See id.
67. Noveck, supra note 58, at 70 (partially citing AMY GUTMANN AND DENNIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996) and parenthetically noting

that "Chapter 4 discusses the role of accountability in deliberative processes").
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As a result, Greenpeace should require that voting users identify
themselves by name. One can imagine a situation in which a target of
Greenpeace action could hijack the forum and effectively silence the
organization's criticism. The identification requirement would at least
constrain such organized efforts because participants would be
restricted to one vote per name. In addition, tying access to a person's
real world identity would give the Greenpeace community the
opportunity to impose temporary bans on people who repeatedly violate
the rules of discourse.
Finally, Young's concerns would be relieved by the fact that debate
would not be constrained to "formal and general" 68 or "dispassionate and
disembodied" 69 textual argument. This is because the Internet provides
an opportunity to use photographs, audio, and video as a means of
transforming the preferences of others. Given the problem of
translation, the visual media would likely play an enhanced role in the
selection of policy. Seeing pictures of an environmental disaster, for
example, may more easily sway a voter to one's cause than verbal
persuasion. Also, elites constitute a fraction of the possible participants
and would not control the discourse as a judge in a courtroom does, so
proponents of a specific issue would not benefit from appealing in a
manner persuasive to anyone except the participants themselves.
2. Access to Technology and Exclusion
While this model of governance would increase awareness of and
participation in environmental issues and improve Greenpeace's
responsiveness to grassroots concerns, the Internet-based forum would
exclude many people from the decision-making process. For now, this
model does not alleviate the problem that "Greenpeace is a
predominantly Western organization whose views are unrepresentative
even of many citizens in the West"70 and may even exacerbate the
legitimacy problem. Yet, despite problems of access to the Internet and
disparities in skill and time, the benefits of an Internet-driven
deliberative democracy render it an improvement over the current
governance structure.
The Internet is not accessible to all people, so some voices would
necessarily be excluded from a deliberative democratic Greenpeace.
According to one source, only 30.2 percent of the world's population has
access to the Internet, whereas 58.3 percent of Europeans and 78.3

68. YOUNG, supra note 37, at 64.
69. Id.
70. McGinnis, supranote 31.
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percent of North Americans have access. 7' Greenpeace is already
characterized as a predominantly Western organization, and adopting
an Internet-based deliberative democracy would give more volume to
the already-loud Western voices. Yet, this gap in Internet access is
shrinking. In Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, the number of
Internet users has grown 1,037.4 percent, 1,987.0 percent, and 2,527.4
percent, respectively, over the last ten years. 72 During the same period,
growth in North America and Europe was only 151.7 percent and 353.1
percent respectively.73 While a disparity in the ability to participate in
the governance of Greenpeace would exist temporarily, the issue seems
to be resolving itself. The advantages of an increase in participation
outweigh the short-term disadvantages.
Another cause for concern is the Internet-based model would also
allow those with the most technological skill and free time to have a
disproportionately larger influence on matters. Young people are more
likely to possess the skills needed to use technology in its greatest
capacity, giving them a larger voice. As the Internet becomes more
widespread, though, this difference will level out. The more pressing
concern is that those with the most free time would theoretically be able
to cast more votes than those who spend the majority of their time
working, going to school, or caring for children. Time is a resource, and
to render users more equal, a daily cap could be placed on all users'
number of votes. Of course, this limit would disadvantage users who
care the most about the governance of Greenpeace, but deliberative
democracy does not merely require that people be free, but also equal. 74
CONCLUSION
Greenpeace's current developmental republican governance
structure lends itself well to maintaining the financial solvency of the
organization and to executing its policy goals quickly and successfully.
Yet, the organization's activity lacks democratic legitimacy due to the
inability of those whom its projects affect to participate in policy
making. Furthermore, no effective channel for providing criticism exists.
The service requirement for voting is an obstacle that discourages
people from participating in the organization. At the same time,
Greenpeace could improve the quality of its decisions by empowering
people from diverse backgrounds with different needs to meet,
71. World Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm
(last visited Dec. 22, 2011).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Benhabib, supra note 34, at 69.
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communicate, and set the policy goals of the organization. The Internet
might allow for global dialogue that comports to the model described in
deliberative democratic theory, solving the scalability problem that has
prevented deliberative democracy from moving beyond small settings.

